September 17, 2019

The Honorable Lindsey Graham, Chairman  
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member  
Committee on the Judiciary  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chairman  
The Honorable Doug Collins, Ranking Member  
Committee on the Judiciary  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Roger Wicker, Chairman  
The Honorable Maria Cantwell, Ranking Member  
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Chairman  
The Honorable Greg Walden, Ranking Member  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

The undersigned advocacy organizations write to bring to your attention a potentially dangerous new plan by Google, Mozilla, and others that could exacerbate the spread of exploitative content on the Internet, including, but not limited to, online grooming for sexual abuse and sex trafficking and the solicitation and distribution of child sexual abuse images (i.e., child pornography). These changes would also make it more difficult to filter harmful content using, for example, parental controls.
While regulators and watchdogs across the globe are actively working to restrict the spread of exploitative content online, we have recently learned that this plan, which is scheduled to be implemented beginning this month in the United States, could do the opposite: Make it exceedingly difficult to find and prevent online crimes against children.

Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), the plan backed primarily by Google, and in partnership with Mozilla/Cloudflare, is being pitched as a privacy technology to make web surveillance more difficult through encryption of DNS queries and by masking them as encrypted web traffic. DNS, often described as the telephone directory for the Internet, is the system through which an Internet web address such as House.gov is resolved to the underlying IP address that computers use to route the request (143.231.249.141).

Historically, the DNS functionality has been dispersed among many players around the globe on a de-centralized basis, a key feature of the Internet’s design that has helped make it highly resilient over the past few decades. These players have included third-party DNS providers, network operators, and ISPs. But under the new centralized and encrypted DoH plan, a small handful of players led by Google can, in essence, take over DNS resolution for the overwhelming majority of DNS requests on the Internet each day.

Moreover, these companies plan to accomplish this by imposing it on users by default. Google, for instance, would eventually encrypt all DNS traffic from users of its Android operating system and Chrome browser, thus making the company the centralized encrypted DNS provider for the majority (70% in the U.S.) of the Internet.

Last May, in the United Kingdom, Internet safety watchdogs and the National Cyber Security Centre initiated emergency crisis talks with Google, Mozilla, and others, fearing that the companies’ unilateral implementation of DoH would make it impossible to detect and block harmful material, including child-abuse images and terrorist propaganda.

The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), a U.K.-based charity focused on minimizing the online availability of child sexual abuse content (also known as child pornography), has warned that this planned implementation of DoH’s encryption protocol could be catastrophic for two reasons: 1) perpetuating online child abuse by making online crimes against children harder to track by law enforcement and Internet watchdogs, and; 2) making it harder to remove illegal content normally blocked by network operators, ISPs, and other third-party DNS providers under British law.

Fred Langford, the deputy CEO of IWF remarked that under the proposed DoH plan, millions of images and videos of child sexual abuse could suddenly be unshielded from public view. Currently, IWF provides ISPs and investigators a “block list” of live webpages of child sexual abuse used by DNS resolvers to prevent millions of criminal images from being made available on the Internet. Langford believes that DoH’s forced and centralized encryption could soon render such tools obsolete by hiding user “requests,” bypassing filters and parental controls, and making globally criminal material freely accessible.

Here in the U.S., under the current de-centralized DNS regime, Internet watchdogs and law enforcement can, with appropriate court orders, ask those provisioning DNS for vitally important information – what websites are hosting child sexual abuse images, for instance.

While in theory the same information could be requested from Google and Mozilla/Cloudflare under a DoH regime, the forced encrypted nature of the DNS requests may make it impossible for these companies to assist legitimate investigations or even block illegal content even if they wanted to, given the short period of time they purportedly retain logs. Cloudflare, for instance, has previously said that it
only logs DNS requests for 24 hours before deleting them. Additionally, some existing controls in use today by parents and schools will no longer work, creating confusion and allowing harmful illegal content to spread before solutions can be formulated.

To be clear, our aim is not to demonize technology, and we clearly recognize that Internet users’ data should be secure. Furthermore, we are not calling for DoH to be banned, and we acknowledge that Internet encryption can serve useful security and privacy purposes.

While Google and others are rightly striving to protect privacy, they have failed to prioritize child safety by not adequately accounting for the potential unintended consequences of encryption. Although Google claims filtering technology will be unaffected by these rollouts, third party technology, child development, sexual exploitation, and law enforcement experts are alarmed by the rollout of these changes without sufficient subject matter consultation on whether those claims will prove accurate.

We therefore strongly urge you to look into the unforeseen consequences of the plan by Google, Mozilla/Cloudflare, and others to initiate DoH technology and seek ways to delay its implementation until potential unintended consequences to child safety have been thoroughly investigated and addressed.

Sincerely,

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